As EU enlargement has gained geopolitical importance, the Union’s decision-making procedures in the accession process have come under renewed scrutiny. While the EU Treaties require unanimity only for key decisions, in practice it is also applied to numerous intermediary steps. This creates opportunities for individual vetoes that can block progress irrespective of candidate countries’ reform performance.
The policy paper examines how qualified majority voting (QMV) could be introduced at these intermediary stages without requiring Treaty change. It presents four models, ranging from the comprehensive use of QMV to a more limited approach applying it only to the opening of negotiating clusters. The models differ in their scope, voting thresholds and safeguards for Member States.
Using the blocked opening of the Fundamentals cluster with Ukraine as an example, the paper illustrates how these different models could work in practice. Rather than advocating a single model, it seeks to map the available political options and highlight the trade-offs between efficiency, consensus and national interests.