

WAHLMONITOR **iep***Parliamentary  
Election**Armenia*

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**1. Election results: key findings, issues and trends**

The parliamentary election in Armenia on 7 June 2026 was a decisive moment for the country's future foreign and security policy. According to the final vote count, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's ruling Civil Contract Party (KP) secured 49.8 % of the vote, thereby retaining its parliamentary majority. The main opposition force was the 'Strong Armenia' alliance led by the Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, which secured 23.3 % of the vote, whilst other parties trailed significantly behind. Voter turnout reached nearly 59 %, which was significantly higher than in the last parliamentary election in 2021 (49%).


The election campaign centred on issues of national security and Armenia's geopolitical positioning between Russia and its European and transatlantic partners. Alongside the continuation of the peace process with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan focused his campaign on a gradual rapprochement with the US, following the recently launched "Trump Route for International Peace and Security" (TRIPP), and with the EU. The latter includes efforts towards visa liberalisation and, in the long term, EU candidate status for Armenia. Symbolic reinforcement for this course came from the summit of the European Political Community (EPC) in Yerevan in May 2026, which was also attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Domestic issues related to corruption and political credibility were equally important. Opposition figures such as former President Robert Kocharyan faced criticism over past corruption scandals, yet were still able to rally support by criticising Pashinyan's handling of the Karabakh conflict. Notably, Pashinyan is accused of conducting negotiations with Azerbaijan in a non-transparent manner, with dissatisfaction growing particularly among younger voters. More recently, Pashinyan caused controversy through polarising remarks about refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite these tensions, the election result provisionally confirms Pashinyan's course of foreign policy diversification and regional normalisation, including efforts towards open borders and a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

**2. Government formation: outlook and next steps**

Based on the current projections, three political forces are expected to enter the new Armenian parliament: Nikol Pashinyan's ruling KP party, the opposition alliance 'Strong Armenia', and the 'Armenia' alliance led by former President Robert Kocharyan (9.9 %). According to the results from the Central Election Commission, the fourth-largest party, "Prosperous Armenia", fell short of the 4 % threshold with 3.996 % of the vote and thus narrowly missed entering parliament, but requested a recount. This means that the incoming parliament will



provisionally consist of three parliamentary groups, which is in line with Armenian electoral law that guarantees at least three political forces in parliament even if the threshold is not met.

Given the KP's parliamentary majority, the continuation of the current government under Pashinyan is considered certain. However, the majority is smaller than in the previous legislative term. During the election campaign, the ruling party had speculated on securing a two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. This would have been relevant in the context of a possible peace agreement with Azerbaijan, as Baku is pressing for an amendment to the Armenian constitution regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

### 3. Implications for EU-Armenia relations

The parliamentary election confirms the country's pro-European foreign policy shift and reinforces the Pashinyan government's stance towards the EU. As such, the KP's election victory is a decision on Armenia's geopolitical orientation.

During the election campaign, Pashinyan signalled a further deepening of relations with the EU and the US. The EU publicly supports the reform agenda and recently pledged an aid package worth 50 million euros, after Russia had increased pressure during the election campaign and imposed import restrictions on Armenian agricultural products. The EU also announced practical support for affected sectors and promised short-term export opportunities for Armenian products into the EU. This week, the first shipment of 10,000 flowers arrived in Latvia. At the same time, Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed the EU's long-term commitment to implementing the ambitious connectivity partnership with Armenia that was agreed at the EPC summit. A joint EU-Armenia task force will be established to coordinate the implementation of

the cooperation measures. From the EU's perspective, Armenia is a strategic hub between Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The European policy course is closely linked to the regional peace process. Progress in negotiations with Azerbaijan, as well as reforms in the areas of the rule of law and democracy, will continue to be key factors in the EU's relations with Armenia. Despite achievements since the so-called Velvet Revolution in 2018, ongoing shortcomings remain in the areas of anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms and the protection of minority rights. Furthermore, the opposition and parts of the population reject efforts to decouple the country's security policy from Russia; Armenia remains a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Eurasian military alliance under Russian leadership. While the election result therefore strengthens Armenia's European trajectory, it does not eliminate the significant domestic political tensions that accompany this course.

### **About the Author**

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### **About Wahlmonitor**

The IEP's Election Monitor tracks and analyses elections across Europe through factsheets, background information, short interviews and election analyses. In this way, the IEP promotes transnational debate on European policy issues.

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### **Editor**

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### **Layout**

Julia Winter, Eva-Marie Mall

### **ISSN: 2941-0088**

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